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Abstract 
I reconcile the spatiotemporal location of repeatable artworks and impure sets with the non-
location of natural numbers despite all three being varieties of abstract object. This is possible 
because while the identity conditions for all three can be given by abstraction principles, in the 
former two cases spatiotemporal location is a congruence for the relevant equivalence relation, 




Here are three claims often taken to be individually true, but jointly inconsistent (e.g. Mag Uidhir 
[2012: 3-11]): 
(1) Natural numbers are not located in space or time. 
(2) Repeatable artworks are located in space and time: Anna Karenina came into existence 
after 1870, and is yet to reach the far ends of the cosmos. 
(3) Both natural numbers and repeatable artworks are abstract objects. 
These appear to be jointly inconsistent because (3) is taken to be inconsistent with (2). Supposedly, 
part of what it is to be an abstract object is being metaphysically incapable of spatiotemporally 
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location (hereon simply location). My goal in this essay is to resolve this apparent inconsistency: 
the locatability of repeatable artworks does not impugn their abstractness. 
Section 1 observes that both natural numbers and sets can have their identity conditions 
captured by abstraction principles – roughly (for now) statements individuating entities of one 
kind in terms of equivalence relations on other entities. Section 2 argues that attention to the 
equivalence relations featuring in the abstraction principles for numbers and sets reveals the 
consistency of regarding the latter as capable of location but not the former. Section 3 extends this 
argument to repeatable artworks by proposing an abstraction principle individuating such artworks 
socio-historically in terms of acts of creation (cf. Levinson [1980] and Thomasson [1999]), and 
running the reasoning from section 2. Section 4 steps back and makes general observations 
regarding which properties of concreta can also be had by which abstracta. I conclude by 
speculating that we have a hierarchy of abstract objects, with sets and repeatable artworks at a 
lower level than natural numbers. 
 
1: Characterizing Abstract Objects 
One standard contemporary view of abstract objects takes being metaphysically incapable of being 
spatiotemporally located as (at least partly) constitutive of what it is to be abstract.1 The main 
alternative regards abstracts as inherently acausal. Noting that non-spatiotemporality plausibly 
entails acausality,2 but not vice-versa,3 suggests that non-spatiotemporality is more fundamental. 
                                                 
1 Cf. chapter 2 of Cowling [2017] for an overview. 
2 E.g. Heck [2012: 200]: “If abstract objects are not even spatial, they presumably cannot cause anything to happen.” 
3 E.g. Cowling [2017: p.82]: “Suppose, for example, that there could be entities of the sort that Forrest (1981) calls 
epiphenomenalons – “particles that than no more useless can be conceived of” – which are neither created nor 
destroyed and stand in no causal relations to other entities (including other epiphenomenalons). […] intuitively, 
these causally inactive entities would be concrete…” 
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Nevertheless this essay mainly concerns whether all abstracta are non-spatiotemporal; causality 
receives only brief discussion in section 4. 
Now, characterizing abstracta as inherently non-spatiotemporal is a negative 
characterization, in terms of what abstracta are not. But we might prefer a characterization of 
abstract objects in terms of what they are rather than what they aren’t. We could then ascertain the 
(non-) spatiotemporality of abstracta in light of this positive characterization. 
 Here is a positive characterization of one kind of abstract object: natural numbers. Neo-
Fregeans about arithmetic take the identity conditions for natural numbers as given by an 
abstraction principle sometimes called Hume’s Principle:4 
 ∀F∀G [#F = #G ↔ F 1-1 G]. 
Here “#” expresses a function from Fregean concepts (functions to truth-values) to objects (the 
natural numbers) and “F 1-1 G” abbreviates the (second-order) formula stating that there is a 
bijection between the entities falling under F and those falling under G, i.e. the Fs and Gs are 
equinumerous.5  
Neo-Fregeans about arithmetic take Hume’s Principle to be epistemically and 
metasemantically important in a right philosophical account of arithmetic because (i) it entails, in 
suitably strong logics, the Dedekind-Peano axioms for arithmetic; and (ii) they take it to be 
something like an analytic or conceptual truth.6 However our concern is not with whether Hume’s 
Principle plays any epistemic or metasemantic roles. Rather, all we require is that it capture the 
identity-conditions for natural numbers – i.e. that it be true. 
                                                 
4 So named because Frege references Hume when giving the principle in Grundlagen §63 
5 ∃R∀x[(Fx → ∃!y(Gy & Rxy)) & (Gx → ∃!y(Fy & Ryx))]. 
6 Cf. e.g. Hale & Wright [2001: 4-14]. 
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 Sets have also been given a neo-Fregean treatment which takes them to be, like numbers, 
abstracts of concepts. Frege’s own abstraction principle for sets7 was his famously inconsistent 
Basic Law V; hence the hunt is still on for a consistent principle preserving the neo-Fregean 
payoffs.8 The main avenue of investigation so far has been restricting Frege’s law to prevent 
forming paradoxical sets. Every such restriction is a version of the following: 
 (RV): ∀FGood(F)∀GGood(G)[{x: Fx} = {x: Gx} ↔ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx)]. 
Here “Good(F)” abbreviates a (to be determined) restriction of the prenex universal quantifiers to 
concepts not generating paradoxical sets. There is as yet little consensus on what this restriction 
should be. But note that every version of RV features the equivalence relation of co-extensionality, 
∀x(Fx ↔ Gx), on its right-hand side. Indeed, Hale (2000) argues that a necessary condition on an 
abstraction principle being a candidate principle for sets is that it feature co-extensionality (or a 
‘close relative’), on pain of changing the subject [Hale 2000: 332]. Moreover, as with numbers, 
whether RV plays epistemic or metasemantic roles is unimportant; what matters is its truth. 
 If this is correct, then we have at least one positive thing we can say about both sets and 
natural numbers – their identity conditions can be given by statements with the logical form:9 
 (AP): ⸢∀αΧ(α)∀βΧ(β)[§α = §β ↔ Σ(α, β)]⸣. 
Here α and β range over a collection of Fregean concepts called the base sort; the subscript Χ(α) 
expresses a restriction of the subscripted quantifier; § a function from the base sort to objects; and 
                                                 
7 Cognoscenti will be aware that Frege himself dealt with extensions or value-ranges of concepts rather than sets, and 
there is a historical debate about the extent to which these notions coincide. However rather than embrangling in such 
debates I indulge in anachronism by speaking as if Frege dealt directly with sets. 
8 There is another project – that of finding weakenings of second-order logic against which V is consistent – but I 
won’t discuss it here; but see, e.g., Heck [1996]. 
9 This is Davidson’s notion of ‘logical form’, where the logical form of a sentence specifies the entailment relations 
it stands in: “to give the logical form of a sentence is to give its logical location in the totality of sentences, to 
describe it in a way that explicitly determines what sentences it entails and what sentences it is entailed by.” 
[Davidson 1967/2000: 64] 
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Σ an equivalence relation on the base sort.11 Given these conventions a more accurate statement of 
Hume’s Principle is: 
 (HP): ∀FND(F)∀GND(G)[#F = #G ↔ F 1-1 G]. 
The restriction to ND (Numerically Determinate) concepts rules out both non-sortal concepts like 
is red (and is self-identical) and ‘indefinitely extensible’ concepts like is an ordinal number, 
neither of which can be sensibly assigned a determinate number.12 Both restrictions have been 
defended by at least one prominent neo-Fregean (cf. [Wright 1997/2001: 313-6]). 
 The next section shows that regarding both numbers and sets as having identity conditions 
articulated by statements of the form AP facilitates a unified explanation of why sets could be 
located by being co-located with their members, but numbers cannot be located. Section 3 extends 
this reasoning to repeatable artworks. 
 
2: Natural Numbers, Sets, and Spatiotemporal Location 
Let an assignment of spatiotemporal locations to entities of a kind K be trivial if it assigns no 
locations to any Ks, assigns the same location(s) to all (located) Ks, or assigns location(s) to Ks in 
an arbitrary way. The idea then is that abstract Ks can be located if and only if there is a nontrivial 
assignment of locations to Ks. 
                                                 
11 There are also abstraction principles whose base sorts are objects, rather than concepts, but I won’t discuss them 
here. The technique of encoding restrictions to appropriate concepts is from Cook & Ebert [2005]. The absence of any 
restriction is elliptical for a limit-case restriction satisfied by all concepts (e.g. self-co-extensiveness). 
12 Non-sortal concepts are (at first blush) those for which it makes no sense to ask how many objects fall under them. 
Indefinitely extensible concepts are (at first blush) those such that whenever we have circumscribed the supposed 
totality of objects falling under one such concept, we can thereby generate another object falling under that concept 
but not in the given totality. For a concept F of either kind there appears to be no determinate answer to the question 
“how many Fs are there?”. Note that other restrictions of HP have been proposed, such as to finite concepts, e.g. Heck 
[1997].  
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 It seems the only nontrivial way of locating a set is to co-locate it with the mereological 
fusion of its members.14 Suppose the Eiffel Tower occupies a certain spatiotemporal region l1 in 
central Paris and Big Ben another region l2 in downtown London. Then the fusion of the Eiffel 
Tower and Big Ben occupies the (disconnected) spatiotemporal region comprised of both (and 
only) l1 and l2, which I’ll call “l1 ∪ l2”. Seeing as the fusion of the Eiffel Tower and Big Ben 
occupies l1 ∪ l2, the impure set {the Eiffel Tower, Big Ben} occupies l1 ∪ l2 also. Thus (as I’ll say) 
the fusion of Big Ben and the Eiffel Tower and {the Eiffel Tower, Big Ben} are co-located.15 
 Given RV, we can take a set as co-located with the fusion of the objects falling under the 
set-generating concept. Let ‘fus(F)’ denote the fusion of the objects falling under F. Then our 
located sets thesis is: 
 (LST): ∀FGood(F)[{x: Fx} occupies li ↔ fus(F) occupies li]. 
The LST is our official statement that some (neo-Fregean) sets are spatiotemporally located. 
 Turning to natural numbers, parity of reasoning counsels that the only nontrivial 
assignment of locations to numbers is to take the number #F as co-located with the fusion of the 
Fs. Call this the located numbers thesis: 
 (LNT): ∀FND(F)[#F occupies li ↔ fus(F) occupies li].16 
                                                 
14 Cf. Cook [2013: 224]: “[I]f an impure set has any location whatsoever, then it must be co-located with its 
members. Any other location is as arbitrary as any other, and hence there is no conceivable reason for the set to have 
one location rather than another. Presumably, however, if an object has a location, then there must be some reason 
why it has that location.” Note that the particular way of locating sets I’m about to give assumes both unrestricted 
composition and substantivalism. Nevertheless any way of assigning locations to groups of objects should do the 
trick (including pluralities; cf. footnote 16). 
15 More accurately, sets occupy the same region occupied by the fusions of the non-sets in their transitive closure: the 
sets of their members, members of members, etc. A set whose transitive closure includes at least one non-set is an 
impure set. Thus {Ø} occupies no region whilst {{Ø}, the Eiffel Tower} occupies l1. Moreover, sets whose transitive 
closures contain co-located objects are themselves co-located; l1 is occupied by all three of {{Ø}, the Eiffel Tower}, 
{the Eiffel Tower}, {{the Eiffel Tower}}, and many others. One special case of this is that every set is co-located 
with its own singleton (if either is located at all).  
16 These claims can also be made using pluralities without appeal to either Fregean concepts or fusions. E.g. we 
replace HP with ∀xx∀yy(#xx = #yy ↔ xx 1-1 yy), and LNT with ∀xx( #xx occupies li ↔ xx occupies li). I’ve not gone 
this way for two reasons. First, plural logic is less universally accepted than singularist logic, functions (to truth 
values), and fusions. Second, the neo-Fregean research I’m leaning on has been almost exclusively carried out along 
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Here is why the LNT fails as a nontrivial assignment of locations to numbers. (This argument 
closely follows that in Cook [2013: 224]). 
Take the concepts identical to Luke or Leia (hereon ‘L’) and identical to Han or Chewie 
(hereon ‘H’).17 We thus have an instance of HP: 
 #L = #H ↔ L 1-1 H. 
The right-hand side of this instance of HP is itself true (in the fiction): the Ls and Hs are 
equinumerous. So the left-hand side is true also. We now reason as follows: 
(1) #L occupies li ↔ fus(L) occupies li.   (Instance of LNT.) 
(2) #H occupies li ↔ fus(H) occupies li.   (Instance of LNT.) 
(3) #L = #H.       (Consequence of HP.) 
(4) #L occupies li ↔ #H occupies li.    (3, laws of =.) 
Therefore, 
(5) fus(L) occupies li ↔ fus(H) occupies li.   (1, 2, 4.) 
Thus the fusion of Luke and Leia is co-located with the fusion of Han and Chewie. This is 
obviously false (in the fiction). Therefore the LNT fails: if HP gives the identity conditions for 
natural numbers, then such numbers cannot be assigned locations by the LNT. Given that the LNT 
describes the only nontrivial assignment, there is no such assignment. Natural numbers cannot be 
located. 
Note as we’re going past that this argument fails if we weaken the LNT from a 
biconditional to the following unidirectional conditional: 
 (LNT*): fus(F) occupies li → #F occupies li. 
                                                 
singularist lines, and I do not have space here to re-formulate it in pluralist terms. Nevertheless I conjecture (without 
proof) that the arguments I’m giving would go through in a pluralist setting. 
17 These are Cook’s examples. 
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LNT* says if the fusion of the Fs occupies li, then the number of Fs occupies li too, but does not 
license the inference from #F occupying li to fus(F) occupying li. What distinguishes it from the 
LNT is that we could have fus(L) occupying l1, fus(H) occupying l2, and #L (= #H) occupying both 
l1 and l2, while fus(L) does not occupy l2 nor does fus(H) occupy l1. 
If we replace (1) and (2) in the above inference with instances of LNT*, then 5 no longer 
follows from 1, 2, and 4: 
(1*) fus(L) occupies li → #L occupies li.   (Instance of LNT*.) 
(2*) fus(H) occupies li → #H occupies li.   (Instance of LNT*.) 
(3) #L = #H.       (Consequence of HP.) 
(4) #L occupies li ↔ #H occupies li.    (3, laws of =.) 
Therefore, 
(5) fus(L) occupies li ↔ fus(H) occupies li.   (1*, 2*, 4.) 
The move from (1*), (2*) and (4) to (5) is not valid – it infers the location of a fusion from a 
location of its number. This requires the opposite direction of the conditionals in (1*) and (2*) than 
those licensed by the LNT*. 
LNT* not only provides a formal fix – it also embodies commitment to numbers being 
multiply located amongst the regions occupied by the fusions of the objects falling under the 
relevant concepts. So far this is neutral between numbers being wholly but not exclusively located 
in the distinct regions occupied by the relevant fusions (as some18 say the colour red is wholly 
present in both my garden and the local fire station), versus having parts that are co-located with 
the fusions of the objects falling under the relevant concepts (just as my left hand is in one place, 
and my right another; but I am not bilocated). 
                                                 
18 E.g. Armstrong [1989: 98-9]. 
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While an interesting result, there is reason to deny that natural numbers are multi-located 
à la LNT*. An assignment of locations to abstract objects of kind K is nontrivial only if it doesn’t 
co-locate all K’s. Let a be some entity occupying a location li. Then by LNT*, 1 is co-located with 
a, and so occupies li. Now two things occupy li (a and 1). And so by the LNT* 2 occupies li. And 
now three things occupy li – a, 1, and 2. Thus 3 occupies li. And so on… whence every natural 
number occupies li. The result generalizes; every number is co-located with every located entity 
(including every other number). Hence LNT* entails that all numbers are co-located, and is thus a 
trivial assignment of locations to numbers. Note that this argument can also be run for the LNT, 
so we now have two reasons that it fails as a nontrivial assignment of locations to numbers. 
Turning now to whether there is a nontrivial assignment of locations to sets, one difference 
between numbers and sets is that HP features the equivalence relation of equinumerosity, whereas 
RV features the distinct relation of co-extensionality. Now, the LNT and LST both have abstract 
objects inheriting properties of fusions in the following way: 
(PI)19: ⸢∀αΧ(α)[Φ(§(α)) ↔ Ψα]⸣. 
Suppose we have an abstraction principle ⸢∀αΧ(α)∀βΧ(β)[§α = §β ↔ Σ(α, β)]⸣ and a property-
inheritance ⸢∀αΧ(α)[Φ(§(α)) ↔ Ψα]⸣. This conjunction entails that Ψ expresses a congruence for Σ, 
i.e.: 
⸢∀αΧ(α)∀βΧ(β)[Σ(α, β) → (Ψ(α) ↔ Ψ(β))]⸣. 
This reveals a deeper explanation of the problem with the LNT. Spatiotemporal location is not a 
congruence for equinumerosity. That F 1-1 G and fus(F) occupies li does not entail that fus(G) 
                                                 
19 ‘PI’ stands for ‘property inheritance’. The idea that abstraction involves inheriting congruent properties has been 
discussed elsewhere, e.g. Linnebo [2012]; but (i) these discussions don’t address the unity of apparently heterogenous 
abstracta for which I’m arguing, and (ii) in section 4 I’ll propose another kind of property determination not discussed 
by Linnebo. There may also be important connections to Charles Parson’s distinction between pure abstract and ‘quasi-
concrete’ objects (which have ‘intrinsic representations’, cf. Parsons [2008: §7]). See footnote 38 below for (slightly) 
further discussion. 
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occupies li. And if location is not a congruence for equinumerosity, then one of HP or the LNT is 
not true. Given that HP is not up for grabs, we reject the LNT.  
 Things are different for sets. Assume ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx). Now, if anything is F if and only if it 
is G, then the fusion of the Fs and the fusion of the Gs are identical. But if fus(F) = fus(G) then a 
fortiori they are co-located. Location is a congruence for co-extensionality. Therefore the LST is 
consistent with RV. 
If this is right, then there is a nontrivial assignment of locations to sets, but not to natural 
numbers. We now turn to repeatable artworks. 
 
3: Repeatable Artworks 
The repeatability of works of music and literature suggests they are not identical to any physical 
entity, and are thus abstract. However commonsense presumes that such repeatable artworks are 
created and destroyable [Levinson 1980: 7-9; Thomasson 1999: 9]. Now, it seems that if an entity 
x is created, there is a time before which x does not exist and after which it does. And, for x to be 
destroyed, there must be a time before which x exists and after which it does not. Moreover, some 
philosophers have claimed that repeatable artworks are spatially located, in the sense that Anna 
Karenina is present here on Earth, but not on Twin Earth where there is instead a qualitative 
duplicate [Burgess and Rosen 1997: 21-2]. If this is right, then repeatable artworks cannot be non-
spatiotemporal abstracta. But if to be abstract is to lack location, then repeatable are not abstract 
– whence they must be concrete. 
Amie Thomasson has argued that works of literature cannot be located [Thomasson 1999: 
36-8]. Here is my generalization of her argument to repeatable artworks as a whole:  
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P1: If repeatable artworks have physical features like size, mass, or spatiotemporal 
location, they inherit those features from their copies (books, scores, performances, 
memories, etc.). (This is the only nontrivial assignment of such features.) 
P2: Repeatable artworks don’t change size or mass when their copies do. (Intuition.) 
Therefore, 
C1: Repeatable artworks ≠ (collections of) their copies. (P2, law of =.) 
Therefore, 
C2: Repeatable artworks are not located. (C1 and P1.) 
But C2 does not follow from C1 and P1. This is because repeatable artworks being distinct from 
(collections or fusions of) their copies does not entail that repeatable artworks do not inherit 
location from their copies. The reasoning parallels that for sets. First we state the identity 
conditions for repeatable artworks in terms of an equivalence relation E on Fregean concepts. Next 
we state how works inherit the locations of their copies. And finally, we show that location is a 
congruence for E. 
First we need an abstraction principle for repeatable artworks. According to Thomasson 
[1999] and Levinson [1980], works of literature and musical works (respectively) are individuated 
by their origins. Works w1 and w2 are identical if and only if they are the products of the same act 
of authorship or composition.20 Two concrete entities are token copies of the same work if and 
only if they are each appropriately causally connected – via acts of copying of some kind – to the 
same act of creation.21 For example, that the copy of Anna Karenina currently in my bookshelf is 
                                                 
20 I’m assuming that distinct repeatable artworks can’t both result from the very same act of creation. While this claim 
may require some defense – perhaps an author can write two novels using the very same token actions – I won’t pause 
to give that defense here. 
21 See Levinson [1980: 25-26] and Thomasson [1999: 64-65] for discussions of what these appropriate causal relations 
could be. I set aside questions about individuating acts of creation themselves. 
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a copy of the same work of literature as some thing in my university’s library results from both 
physical entities each standing in appropriate causal chains tracing back to Tolstoy’s penning of 
the original manuscript.22 A qualitative duplicate of my copy of Anna Karenina located on Twin 
Earth is not a copy of Tolstoy’s greatest novel because it does not stand in the right causal 
connections to him. Likewise token performances, scores, recordings, or memories are copies of 
Clair de Lune if and only if appropriately causally connected to Debussy’s original act of 
composition. 
Here’s how to capture this origin-determined identity condition on repeatable artworks 
using an abstraction principle. Let F be a Fregean concept under which fall all and only token 
copies of a given work (e.g. is a copy of Anna Karenina). Let w be a function from Fregean 
concepts to works, so that w(F) is the work all and only copies of which fall under F. Let F and G 
be co-created if and only if the entities falling under F and those falling under G are appropriately 
causally connected to the same act of creation. Then we have: 
 (APW): ∀FΧ(F)∀GΧ(G)[w(F) = w(G) ↔ F and G are co-created]. 
That is, two works are identical if and only if all their copies stand in appropriate causal 
connections to the very same act of creation. This is the Thomasson-Levinson conception of works 
of literature and music described above.25 
Here is how to locate repeatable artworks individuated by APW. Let fus(W) be the fusion 
of the entities falling under W (so that fus(is a copy of Anna Karenina) is the fusion of all copies 
of Anna Karenina). Then the claim that repeatable artworks inherit their locations from the fusions 
of their copies is the following located works thesis: 
                                                 
22 I set aside questions about individuating acts of creation themselves. 
25 APW may not be very useful in explaining the identity conditions for repeatable artworks to someone who does not 
already grasp that notion. But just as with HP and RV, we are not asking APW to do any epistemic/metasemantic 
work – all we need is that it be true. 
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(LWT): ∀FΧ(F)[w(F) occupies li ↔ fus(F) occupies li]. 
The LWT says if one copy of Anna Karenina moves or ceases to exist, then Anna Karenina itself 
changes location. Thus that work was initially located only in Russia – because that’s where all its 
copies were – but now envelopes the whole globe (but not Twin Earth). Likewise if all token 
scores, forthcoming performances, and people knowing how to play or remember hearing Clair de 
Lune move to the Southern Hemisphere, then so does that work itself. 
 It remains to show that location is a congruence for co-creation. If F and G are co-created, 
then any entity falling under F – i.e., any copy of w(F) – also falls under G, and thus is a copy of 
w(G), and vice-versa. Hence if F and G are co-created, then fus(F) = fus(G). Therefore location is 
a congruence for co-creation.  
Indeed, if the equivalence relation in the abstraction principle for repeatable artworks is 
any equivalence relation entailing that identical works have all and only the same copies – surely 
a desirable result – then the LWT describes a nontrivial assignment of locations to repeatable 
artworks. 
 Thus my generalizations of Thomasson’s premises do not entail that there is no nontrivial 
assignment of locations to repeatable artworks in terms of those of their copies. We can take them 
to be co-located with the fusions of their copies. I make one brief observation before, in section 4, 
connecting this with our earlier discussion of numbers and sets. 
 Recall the commonsense presumption that repeatable artworks are created and destroyable. 
The LWT tells us exactly when this happens. A repeatable artwork is created when a fusion of its 
copies comes into existence.26 That is, it is created when its first copy is; i.e., when the first 
                                                 
26 Note that this is consistent with the concept (e.g.) is a copy of Anna Karenina not being created. If there are no 
copies of Anna Karenina, then that concept does not figure in any true instance of APW, whence ‘w(is a copy of Anna 
Karenina)’ does not denote. 
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manuscript is authored, or the first act of storytelling enacted, or the first ‘memory’ of it occurs. 
(Note that any vagueness in these times will be inherited by the time of creation of the work itself. 
But we should view this as a feature of the view rather than a bug.) Similarly, a work is destroyed 
when there is no longer any fusion of its copies; which is to say, when its last copy is destroyed.27 
This coincides with Thomasson’s own conditions for creation and destruction of works of literature 
[Thomasson 1999:7-14]. Likewise for the creation of Levinson’s musical works (though he is 
ambivalent about whether musical works can be destroyed [2011: 261-3]). 
However, there may seem to be a tension here: I’ve said that if a repeatable artwork lacks 
any location, then it doesn’t exist. Parity of reasoning might suggest the same for natural numbers 
and sets. By section 2, neither numbers nor pure sets are located. But we don’t want this to impugn 
the existence of those abstract mathematical objects.  
Now, the difference here is that the concepts appearing in true instances of HP and RV can 
have both located and non-located entities fall under them. But the concepts featuring in true 
instances of APW can only have token copies of artworks – which are intelligently manufactured 
concreta – fall under them. Thus such concepts can only have located entities fall under them. 
Therefore if such a concept has no located entities falling under it, nothing falls under it, whence 
it stands in no co-creation relation to any concept (including itself). But then it figures in no true 
instance of APW, and there is no repeatable artwork corresponding to it. 
The final section turns from location to other physical features like shape, mass, and 
possession of causal powers. 
 
                                                 
27 There is a question here about whether works can be ‘resurrected’ – can all copies of a work be destroyed, and then 
later on a new copy of that very same work come into existence? I address this in section 3. I’m also setting aside any 
worry that if time travel is possible, then a work may have copies pre-dating its creation (but see Lewis [1976: 148-
9]). 
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4: Abstract Entities, Mereological Fusions, and Physical Features 
If what I’ve said so far is correct, then there is a nontrivial assignment of locations to impure sets 
and to repeatable artworks, but no such assignment for natural numbers. This is because (i) if 
location is not a congruence for an equivalence relation, then abstract objects individuated in terms 
of that relation cannot be nontrivially assigned locations; and (ii) location is a congruence for co-
extensionality and co-creation, but not equinumerosity. 
This result generalizes. We’ve seen that some equivalence relations E are such that when 
two concepts F and G stand in them, the fusions of the objects falling under them are identical: 
(FI) E(F, G) → fus(F) = fus(G). 
Given that for all (extensional) predicates Φ, ⸢fus(F) = fus(G) → [Φ(fus(F)) ↔ Φ(fus(G))]⸣ – every 
(extensional) predicate expresses a congruence for identity – if R satisfies FI, then for every 
(extensional) predicate Φ, ⸢E(F, G) → [Φ(fus(F)) ↔ Φ(fus(G))]⸣. But then, any extensional 
property of fusions can be nontrivially assigned to objects individuated in terms of R via a PI-
assignment ⸢∀FΧ(F)[Φ(§(F)) ↔ Φ(fus(F)]⸣.28 Call this the fusion congruence result: 
(FC): if ┌∀αΧ(α)∀βΧ(β)[§α = §β ↔ Σ(α, β)]┐ and ┌Σ(α, β)] → fus(α) = fus(β)┐, then for any 
extensional predicate Φ, ┌∀αΧ(α)[Φ(§α) ↔ Φ(fus(α))]┐ is nontrivial. 
Thus when FI holds for an equivalence relation, then not just location but any extensional property 
of fusions can be nontrivially assigned by a PI-assignment. We can – if we want to – say that ┌§F┐ 
weighs nkg if and only if fus(F) weighs nkg, or that ┌§F┐ is S-shaped if and only if fus(F) is S-
shaped – or even, that ┌§F┐ has causal power C if and only if fus(F) has causal power C. (I discuss 
cases where such claims are intuitively false below.) 
                                                 
28 Thanks to Dan Rabinoff for bringing this to my attention 
16/25 
 On the other hand, when we don’t have FI, then FC fails: not every PI-assignment 
⸢∀αΧ(α)[Φ(§α) ↔ Φ(fus(α))]⸣ is nontrivial. In particular, natural numbers we can have F 1-1 G even 
though fus(F) ≠ fus(G), and so we can have fus(F) occupying li without fus(G) doing so. Similarly, 
none of weight, shape, or possessing a given causal power are congruences for equinumerosity. 
Next I make three observations regarding FC. 
The first observation is that while the FC means we can consistently nontrivially assign 
any extensional property of fusions to certain abstracta, this sometimes gives incorrect results. 
Intuitively, Clair de Lune is around 5 minutes long. Suppose we assign a duration to Clair de Lune 
in terms of the following duration inheritance thesis: 
 (DIT): ∀FΧ(F)[w(F) has duration d ↔ fus(F) has duration d]. 
Now, the duration of the fusion of copies of Clair de Lune far exceeds 5 minutes. Does this mean 
that Clair de Lune could be, appearances notwithstanding, many months long? This is not 
plausible. (Analogous reasoning holds for shapes of letter-types. Fusions of letter-tokens may 
occupy multifarious disconnected regions. So if we say letter-types inherit the shapes of the fusions 
of their tokens, the letter-type S is not ‘S’-shaped.) 
 Here is a response, inspired by Kit Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects [Fine 198529]. Fine 
says that an arbitrary object a – e.g. an arbitrary number or person – is Φ if and only if every object 
which a ‘arbitrarily represents’ is Φ. Thus an arbitrary natural number > 1 has a unique prime 
decomposition because every non-arbitrary natural number > 1 has a unique prime decomposition. 
We can transpose this to abstract objects as follows:  
                                                 
29 See especially Fine [1985: 9-21]. (Thanks to an anonymous referee here.) 
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(PD): ⸢∀FΧ(F)[Φ(§F) ↔ ∀x(Fx → Φx)]⸣. 
Notice that PD captures the idea of an abstract object ⸢§F⸣ determining a physical property of 
entities falling under F, rather than inheriting a property from the fusion of the Fs. (Just as with 
PI-assignments, PD-assignments are permissible, not obligatory; there may be nontrivial PD-
assignments that nevertheless seem intuitively false). 
Applying this to durations of musical works yields the following duration determination 
thesis: 
 (DDT): ∀FΧ(F)[w(F) has duration d ↔ ∀x(Fx → x has duration d)]. 
This entails that Clair de Lune is roughly 5 minutes long, provided that every copy of it is.30 
(Likewise, perhaps the letter-type S is ‘S’-shaped provided every token of is.31) So assigning 
durations to musical works via DDT rather than DIT nets the intuitively correct answer. 
 However this might look like an ad hoc postulation of a new kind of ‘property correlation’ 
just to get out of a bind. But it seems there is a genuine distinction here: while the duration of a 
copy of a musical work is determined by the length of the work it copies, the location of a musical 
work is determined by that of the work’s copies. Some properties abstracta inherit from other 
entities (e.g. location), others (like duration and shape) abstracta determine other entities to have. 
The distinction between PI- and PD-assignments tracks that between these two ‘directions of 
determination’. If that’s right then we should expect there to be both PI-assignments and PD-
                                                 
30 Setting aside concerns about whether every copy of Clair de Lune even has a duration (maybe memories or scores 
of it don’t). 
31 I.e. ∀FΧ(F)[§(F) has shape S ↔ ∀x(Fx → x has shape S)]. See Wetzel [2009: 61-65] for an argument that shape is 
not in general common to all tokens of the same letter-type.  
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assignments. The move from DIT to DDT is not ad hoc (though I must leave for another time the 
question of which properties are determined and which inherited by which abstracta). 
 My second observation concerns abstracta having causal powers. Given that possessing a 
causal power is a congruence for identity of fusions, if fus(F) has a certain causal power, and FC 
holds for ⸢§F⸣s, then we can say that ⸢§F⸣ has the same power. So perhaps surprisingly, we can 
regard abstracta as having causal powers – provided we can regard fusions having powers of their 
own. While pursuing this line of thought further would take us too far afield, we have established 
a way of regarding an abstract object as located but not having any causal powers: the relevant 
fusion is located but has no powers (perhaps only its parts do). 
 On the other hand, we could use a PD-assignment to say that ⸢§F⸣ has every causal power 
had by every individual F. Again, investigating further would take us too far afield. But observe 
that if there are no powers common to every F, then ⸢§F⸣ will be acausal – and we have another 
way of regarding certain abstract as located by acausal. 
 Now to my third observation. The LST answers questions about the spatiotemporal 
locations of sets in terms of the locations of members. This entails, as a specific case, that the 
temporal location of a set whose members exist at different times is that of the fusion of those 
members. This gives us a response to Roy T. Cook’s argument that there is no plausible assignment 
of temporal locations to impure sets whose members exist at different times [2013: 226-7].  
Consider the set {Socrates, Frege}. What temporal location can it be sensibly assigned? It 
seems we have three options: 
(i) {Socrates, Frege} occupies the intersection of the temporal locations occupied by 
Socrates and Frege. 
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(ii) {Socrates, Frege} occupies the union of the temporal locations occupied by Socrates 
and Frege. 
(iii) {Socrates, Frege} occupies every temporal location. 
The alternative is that {Socrates, Frege} occupies no temporal locations – it’s ‘abstract’ in the 
standard platonist sense.  
We can rule out option (iii) because its generalization temporally co-locates every impure 
set. (i) assigns {Socrates, Frege} no temporal location because there is no temporal region 
occupied by both Socrates and Frege, 
 This leaves (ii). Cook rejects (ii) for two reasons.32 First, (ii) has {Socrates, Frege} 
occupying a discontinuous temporal region – it occupies a region in the 5th century BCE, then 
occupies no region until a stretch of the mid 19th-early 20th centuries, and no region thereafter. 
Second, (ii) violates the ‘spirit’ of the extensionality of sets. The claim seems to be that during the 
5th century BCE, given that Socrates exists but Frege does not, {Socrates, Frege} = {Socrates}. 
From the mid 19th to early 20th centuries, {Socrates, Frege} = {Frege}. And, we might infer, at all 
other times {Socrates, Frege} = Ø. Thus (ii) is out of the running. Having already disposed of (i) 
and (ii), we infer that impure sets of temporally non-overlapping individuals occupy no temporal 
locations. 
My response is to press on Cook’s argument against (ii). Recall that the LST reduces the 
question of the location of a set to that of the fusion of the entities falling under the concept from 
which the set is formed. So the atemporality of {Socrates, Frege} follows only if the fusion of 
Socrates and Frege is also atemporal. Now, Cook professes a ‘natural thought’ according to which 
                                                 
32 Cook [2012: 226]. 
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a set occupies li only of all its members do [2013: 226].33 This has a mereological analogue: a 
fusion occupies a temporal location only if all of its parts do. Absent a reason think otherwise, the 
two stand and fall together. Now, it seems intuitively plausible that the fusion of Socrates and 
Frege exists, has one part in the 5th century BCE, another 23 centuries later, and as a whole 
occupies the union of those regions. What we say about the fusion, we can say about the set: 
{Socrates, Frege} occupies a discontinuous temporal region in virtue of having parts (members) 
occupying parts of that region. Insofar as we don’t worry about fusions occupying discontinuous 
regions, we needn’t worry for sets either. 
Finally, Cook’s misgivings about extensionality can also be relieved by giving up the 
‘natural thought’ and saying that {Socrates, Frege} is never identical to any of {Socrates}, 
{Frege}, or Ø because it has members those other sets do not – even if those members are 
temporally separated. Now, Parsons [2008: §7 f/n 57] observes that this requires an eternalist view 
of time. If this is right, then the same seems to be true of fusions of temporally separated entities 
– allowing that the fusion of Socrates and Frege is never identical to either individual requires 
eternalism. Hence Cook’s argument against the LST requires rejecting eternalism. On the one 
hand, eternalism is a not unpopular view of time amongst contemporary philosophers. On the 
other, one may be content with the fusion of Socrates and Frege being in the past identical to Frege 
alone, and now identical to nothing. I leave the reader to pick their own poison. Either way, the 
thing to note is that the LST does not by itself decide the question, nor is it reduced to absurdity. 
This might raise a question about pure sets. Pure sets are spatiotemporally located only if 
the empty set is. Given that the empty set has no members, the LST does not assign it a location. 
                                                 
33 Compare also Parsons [2008: §7]. 
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Thus the empty set exists at no time. Does it follow that neither the empty set nor any pure set 
exists? This would be the wrong result. 
The best thing to say here is that, just as with numbers, that the empty set occupies no time 
need not entail that it does not exist at all. Pure sets (but not all sets) are atemporal. Provided the 
empty set exists, all pure sets exist; and if the empty set does not exist in time, then neither does 
any pure set. The question then is whether the empty set exists, given that none of its members 
exist (it has none). Fortunately, the existence of the empty set is a straightforward consequence of 
RV. Let F and G both be the concept of non-self-identity. Then we reason as follows: 
(1) {x: x ≠ x } = {x: x ≠ x } ↔ ∀x(x ≠ x ↔ x ≠ x)  (RV with ‘x ≠ x’ for ‘F’ and ‘G’) 
(2) ∀x(x ≠ x ↔ x ≠ x)     (truth of logic) 
(3) {x: x ≠ x } = {x: x ≠ x }    (1, 2) 
(4) ∃x(x = {x: x ≠ x })     (3, ∃-introduction) 
And so the empty set exists. That the LST assigns no location to the empty set is no threat to its 
existence. 
And consider, finally, repeatable artworks. The general case is that the copies of a work 
exist at different times: the first act of storytelling might precede the authoring of the first 
manuscript, which itself may precede many printed copies and editions thereof. However we may 
not face exactly the same problem as we did with the set {Frege, Socrates}. This is because if we 
assume that for c to be a copy of w (hence fall under the concept is a copy of w), c must be 
appropriately causally connected to the creation of w, and that such causal chains are sustained by 
copies, then it is not possible for works to be ‘resurrected’: the destruction of all extant copies 
precludes the possibility of future copies.37 From this it follows that a work exists if and only if at 
                                                 
37 [acknowledgement redacted] 
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least one copy of it does too. And then there is no problem of temporally non-overlapping copies, 
for, for an object to be a copy, there must exist at all intervening times at least one copy. Thus 
repeatable artworks do not face the same problem of occupying discontinuous temporal regions as 
faced by impure sets of temporally separated individuals. (Note also that the identity of a repeatable 
artwork does not seem to be threatened by a change in its copies in the same way that the identity 
of a set is threatened by a change in its members.) 
 
Conclusion 
When the identity conditions for a given kind of abstract object K can be captured by an abstraction 
principle, whether Ks can possess a given physical property P depends on whether that property is 
a congruence for the equivalence relation E featuring in that principle. If it is, then there is a 
nontrivial assignment of P to Ks in terms of which concrete objects are P. But if P is not a 
congruence for E, then there is no such assignment. And so repeatable artworks (and impure sets) 
can be nontrivially assigned locations, whereas natural numbers cannot. So we now have an answer 
to our opening question of how both natural numbers and repeatable artworks could be abstract 
objects if being non-spatiotemporal is part of what it is to be abstract. 
 More generally, we have distinguished two kinds of abstract objects: those such that if ⸢§α 
= §β⸣, then ⸢fus(α) = fus(β)⸣, and that are not. We’ve seen that the former, but not the latter, can be 
nontrivially assigned any extensional property of fusions. This raises the prospect of something 
like a hierarchy of abstracta. We would have one ‘level’ at which abstracta bear some relation to 
fusions of concreta intimate enough for the potential inheritance of all properties possessed by 
those fusions; and another ‘level’, frustrating such universal inheritance and so perhaps further 
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removed from concrete reality.38 Further questions quickly suggest themselves: for instance, where 
do propositions, letter-types, and species occur in this hierarchy? Could propositions be at the 
same level as numbers, whereas letter-types and species are at the sets-and-artworks level? This 
hierarchy is intriguing and, I think, deserves further consideration. 
Thanks to Philip Kremer, Sam Cowling, Chris Tillman,  
Wesley D. Cray, and Dan Rabinoff for discussions of  















                                                 
38 The idea that abstract objects comprise a hierarchy has been suggested before – in particular, in the appendix to 
chapter 2 of Hale [1987]. Hale’s hierarchy is different from that described above, at least at first glance – his is in 
terms of the levels of the concepts comprising the base sorts for abstraction principles. A closer cousin may be 
Parsons’ distinction between pure abstract and quasi-concrete objects (cf. footnote 19) – maybe the level of sets and 
repeatable artworks is that of Parsons’ quasi-concreta. Unfortunately I must leave pursuing this for another time. 
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